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Irregular Migrants at Work and the Groundless Legal Subject 




This chapter considers the legal gaps that construct irregular status for workers with 
precarious legal immigration status, in precarious employment arrangements. These gaps 
illustrate work that goes beyond formal legal categories in UK employment law and 
immigration. However the work performed by migrants (non-UK and non-EU citizens) is not 
outside of the law and economy. Migrant workers deemed irregular are persons in 
particularly vulnerable employment situations working within the nation-state. The 
ambiguous relationship between irregular migrant workers and UK employment law 
demonstrates firstly, that existing categories of employment law construct vulnerability for 
certain migrants at work. Secondly, the groundless legal subjectivity that irregular migrants 
experience is not unique to their condition but archetypal to all persons subject to the law. 
Thus, labour law, which holds as an aim the protection and fair treatment of persons at work, 
would conceptually benefit from embracing the groundlessness of the legal subject to respond 
to experiences beyond predetermined frames of legal recognition.  
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Irregular migration and work cannot be identified solely as a problem of employment 
law or immigration law or European law per se. The challenge of recognising persons living 
and migrating across borders for work is part of the global movement of capital in which 
there are preferred legal subjects – namely citizens and visa holders often in high-earning 
employment – and irregular legal subjects whose legal status is precarious, uncertain, or who 
are deemed ‘illegal’ as they do not hold the legal immigration status to remain (and work) 
within a country of which they are not a citizen. Migration status, as a function of 
immigration law, is left to the discretion of European Union member states. Many migrants 
can be left in limbo if they cannot be removed to their country of origin through a non-
removal order, but do not have leave to remain, i.e. lack permanent residency (Queiroz 2018, 
4). The situation of irregular migrant workers is an example where the mechanisms of the law 
fail for these individuals. In other words, the law’s limit is exposed as being where the 
‘imaginative capacities’ of the nation-state limit citizenship and recognition of persons within 
their territory (Pryor 2004, 267). In spite of being physically present in the country, and often 
working and therefore actively contributing to the economic and social fabric of the country, 
without legal status these persons are suspended in a legal grey area. Their legal subjectivity 
is irregular; their subject-hood is groundless—it is neither found to rest in citizenship nor in 
employment law.  
The legal categories of employment law and immigration are based on predetermined 
frames of recognition that restrict and condition legal subjectivity according to principles of 
contract law (Collins 2007), the standard employment relationship (Fudge 2014; Langstaff 
2016) and citizenship (Guild 2018; Anderson 2013; Mundlak 2002). The existing legal 
categories of employee, foreign worker or European Union-citizen worker are limited in their 
ability to address what is identified as irregular, where a person may have transgressed an 
element of their immigration status or formal work arrangement. For instance, overstaying a 
work or visitor permit, working more than the permitted hours per week on a student visa or 
changing employers where sponsorship and work visa is contingent on one employer (see 
Anderson 2013). Moreover, the limits of the recognised categories in employment law, 
modelled around the standard employment contract, obscure processes of neo-liberalisation 
(Peck 2012) that seek out cheaper forms of labour where employers are not bound to provide 
job security or reciprocal contractual terms to temporary or subcontracted workers (not 
‘employees’, see Langstaff 2016; Collins 2007).  
Neoliberalisation processes chisel away at formal employment law protections and 
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responsibilities to contribute to an economic market system dependent on persons in irregular 
situations (Fudge and Strauss 2013; Hepple 2011). Workers experience an ‘intensified 
depletion’ (Stewart 2011) of rights, protections and recognition. The lower the value given to 
ones work (‘low-waged’, ‘low-skilled’) the weaker the claim to job security and rights. For 
instance, labour law protections are demanded for workers based on provisions within the 
European Union freedom of movement.i But due to the changing conditions and nature of 
work, the struggle remains to have these rights protected and practiced (Kountouris 2018). 
Meanwhile, irregular migrant workers are found lower down the ladder of protection, often 
working in the most dirty, dangerous and demeaning conditions (3D’s, see Boucher 2008) 
with even less recourse or protection against exploitation by their employers (Mantouvalou 
2018). Employers, moreover, take advantage of the vulnerability of irregular migrant 
workers. In particular, as will be discussed below, when a workers’ immigration status, and 
often physically their identity documents/passport, is dependent on, or held by, the employer 
as is the case with domestic worker visas in the UK.  
The Law and Irregular Migrants at Work  
Law, as a practice and a frame, offers recognition. This recognition is affirmed and re-
affirmed through legal subjectivity. The subjection of persons as legal subjects is troubled 
when persons are in the shadow or gaps of the law. These gaps exist, for instance, when a 
person is in a country in contravention of immigration laws such as overstaying a visitor visa 
but maintaining employment through a contract of employment. Jurisprudential questions 
need to consider, are they legal subjects? Are they excluded from the law? The United 
Kingdom Supreme Court cases of Hounga v Allen [2014] and Taiwo and Onu [2016], 
illustrate how the gaps in employment law contain an experience of work that goes beyond 
formal legal categories in employment law and immigration. Persons such as Miss Hounga, 
Ms Taiwo and Ms Onu are not without legal subjectivity, but their subject-hood and 
subsequent treatment by the law is ambivalent.  
Conventionally, the aim of recognition and the goal of achieving legal subjectivity 
and status is conformity with a subject that is a liberal, individual and autonomous being. 
This liberal legal subject is typified through the standard employment contract: the male, 
able-bodied, citizen worker, working in full time permanent employment, with a single 
employer, with consistent hours and salary. This ‘ideal’ worker has been demystified by 
labour law scholars who draw attention to the current labour market and globalised economic 
system that does not support this type of employment clarity and consistency, 
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notwithstanding that the standard employment contract only ever existed as a reality for a 
very small percentage of the population (Kountouris 2018; Fudge and Strauss 2013).  
Moreover, the liberal, individual, autonomous legal subject presupposes a nation-state system 
whereby the subject remains in the country of birth and citizenship. While this subject may 
theoretically remain the model for legal categories, the practice of employment law in 
tribunal and court levels demonstrate that most legal actors struggle to fit this mould. 
Crucially, irregular migrant workers, especially women from non-EU countries, brought by 
their employer-sponsors to work in private households radically challenge the liberal legal 
subject and standard employment contractual arrangement.  
In the UK Supreme Court case law, legal actors—particularly those who are not able 
to conform to the liberal model—can be seen to shift their position and subjectivity to cover 
up or make up for the gaps inherent in the law.ii The law works by both consolidating its 
limits/ boundaries and responding to difference, always extending beyond itself to include 
what is present but beyond the formal limit. In other words, the law is both determinate and 
indeterminate (Fitzpatrick 156, 2007; Fitzpatrick 124, 2009). The irregular migrant worker is 
a legal subject not ignored by the law: persons in these irregular, grey areas are subjected to 
the determinate law, in that they are included within the ambit of law by their activity, and 
importance, in the labour market.iii However, they are denied recognition as full legal 
subjects; their treatment and ability to receive compensation through legal mechanisms is, in 
the case law, largely indeterminate. Their ambiguous position is a condition of popularly 
reinforced notions that firstly, migrant workers are foreign/non-citizens and therefore not the 
responsibility of the nation-state or worthy of state protection. Secondly, their labour market 
position relegates them to spaces and conditions that are in the margins of statutory 
protection. For instance, often not fulfilling the criteria for ‘employee’ status under the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 (Collins 2007; see also Halawi 2014). Or being in the margins 
of contract law including the doctrine of illegality (Hounga). Or receiving ambiguous 
recognition under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (Broad and Turnbull 2018), which largely 
depends on constructing/presenting the subject as a victim and who has had no part in 
consenting to their treatment and situation. Or the margins of the Equality Act 2010, for 
instance experiencing discrimination based on a characteristic that is not protected until the 
Act such as will be discussed below in Taiwo and Onu [2016].  
The legal grey areas occupied by persons considered irregular migrant labourers 
suggest that to search for a legal remedy for the phenomenon of irregular migrant labourers is 
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to face a legal impasse (for further elaboration on the irregular, see Amaya Castro 2013). 
However, the attempts of legal actors within existing systems and functions of law ultimately 
reveal not an impasse but shifting groundlessness at the core of legal subjectivity in labour 
rights. This groundlessness refers to the unpredictable, ambivalent treatment within the case 
law. Also, more fundamentally, that the irregular migrant is not so much an anomaly (ir-
regular) as an archetypal legal subject in labour law. The legal subject in labour law, migrant 
or citizen, is not definitive because the experience of labour or working is dependent on 
relationships and employment arrangements that differ according to experience. Thus, the 
ambivalent treatment experienced by irregular migrant workers under the law is not uniquely 
the experience of migrant workers but heightened due to their precarious immigration status.  
The law constitutes an order of being, something is made valid when it is legalized, 
but equally what the law sidelines, or maintains as irregular, is also part of its constitution. 
The irregular migrant, living, working, contributing to the economic, social and political 
system is not an outsider but rather is ‘inside’ but significantly lacking equal status and 
subjectivity. Many theorists have written of how one cannot speak about Europe without 
speaking of its other – the non-European inside, or the ‘almost European’ – be it people from 
former colonized countries or those that are seen to aspire to be ‘European’ but are forever 
judged against a European norm (see Balibar 2004; Butler and Spivak 2012). Thus, the 
irregular migrant in Europe cannot be conceptualized as an outsider, and in the UK cases of 
irregular migrants have been heard at the Supreme Court. Thus, irregular migrants are not 
lacking in legal subjectivity, but their subject-hood is differentially treated in the law by the 
nation-state legal regime. This leaves them exposed to exploitation outside state protection.  
Irregular migrant workers, although not totally excluded from legal subjectivity, are a 
demographic that, practically, often cannot gain legal representation in court processes due to 
a lack of resources. There are few cases at the Supreme Court to address the situation of 
irregular migrants at work. However, in the past few years, two cases have significantly 
demonstrated the legal questions and difficulty of extending national legal protection to 
irregular migrants. The two cases, Hounga v Allen [2014] and the jointly heard appeals of 
Taiwo and Onu [2016], are exemplary of labour situations that many other workers 
experience.   
Hounga v Allen [2014] 
The case of Miss Hounga, heard at the UK Supreme Court on appeal in 2014, 
illustrates the condition of legal irregularity that irregular migrant workers may find 
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themselves in, in spite of employment law.  Miss Hounga was a Nigerian national brought to 
work in a private household by the Allen’s in 2007, when she was about 14 years old. She 
travelled with an affidavit that stated she was born in 1986, however Miss Hounga admitted 
that the statement was falsified (she was 14, not 19 years old). Meanwhile, Mrs Allen 
testified to the employment tribunal that the affidavit was true, meaning that Miss Hounga 
was an adult when she arrived to the UK and thus legally able to consent to work and 
employment. Miss Hounga was illiterate and had been orphaned in Nigeria. Upon arriving to 
the UK, she began work at the Allen’s in spite of not holding a work permit. After six months 
her visitor visa expired and she had no legal right to stay and/or work in the UK. 
Nevertheless, Miss Hounga continued to live and work in the Allen household. The Allen’s 
did not pay Miss Hounga for her work and she was subjected to violence, verbal abuse and 
harassment. Miss Hounga was eventually kicked out of the Allen home after Mrs Allen beat 
her, poured water over her and locked her out of the house. Miss Hounga was found in a 
supermarket car park and brought to an NGO that advocated on her behalf.  
The case was brought to the employment tribunal on the basis of racial discrimination 
(under the Race Relations Act 1976 incorporated into the Equality Act 2010, s 9) with 
regards to the harassment suffered during employment and her dismissal. Miss Hounga 
claimed that she was treated less favourably (discriminated against) based on her race. In 
other words a British worker in the same or similar circumstances would have been treated 
more favourably. Contractual claims were also brought to the tribunal based on breach of 
employment contract, unfair dismissal, unpaid wages and holiday pay. At the employment 
tribunal, Miss Hounga’s contract law claims were dismissed based on the doctrine of 
illegality. The doctrine of illegality deems that if there is illegality at the basis of the contract 
– i.e. Miss Hounga’s living and work in the country without legal permit – then the contract 
is void. The racial discrimination claims were dismissed based on Miss Hounga’s failure to 
follow grievance procedures whilst in employment. Furthermore her dismissal from 
employment was held to be due to her illegal immigration status that she was deemed to be 
aware of, therefore not wrongful on the part of the employer (the Allens). The Court of 
Appeal held that the illegality at the basis of Miss Hounga’s presence in the country overrode 
any claims to contractual grievances or discrimination.iv  
The contract law claims were not pursed at the Supreme Court level because of the 
lasting doctrine of illegality in contracts (see Lord Hughes para 54, 59). However, the appeal 
for compensation for the discrimination suffered by Miss Hounga, in spite of the illegality 
underlying their contractual relationship, was revisited. The decision revealed the malleability 
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of legal rules exercised when the will to provide justice for irregular (vulnerable) migrants 
exists. In reviewing the law that dealt with the doctrine of illegality, the Supreme Court 
justices held that the inextricable link test – meaning that there is an inextricable link between 
the illegality and the claim on the contract/employment relationship – had to take public 
policy into account. The public policy considerations of Miss Hounga’s case were two-fold. 
On the one hand, the Court did not want to be seen to condone immigration illegality. On the 
other hand, the Court did not want to explicitly deny Miss Hounga protection in the face of 
her undeniable suffering and vulnerability in the hands of her employers. Additionally, the 
Court held that permitting the doctrine of illegality to override discrimination claims would 
condone the abusive, illegal behaviour of the employers, the Allens.  
Lord Wilson, in the majority decision, raised the following considerations: (a) Would 
the tribunal’s award (compensation) allow Miss Hounga to profit from her wrongdoing? No. 
(b) Did the award ‘permit evasion of a penalty prescribed by the criminal law?’ No, there was 
no prosecution for her entry into the employment contract. (c) Would the award of 
compensation encourage others to act as Miss Hounga did? No. And lastly, (d) ‘Would the 
application of the defence of illegality so as to defeat the award compromise the integrity of 
the legal system by appearing to encourage those in the situation of Mrs Allen to enter into 
illegal contracts of employment?’ and for this final consideration Lord Wilson suggested that 
yes, it was possible that employers would believe they could discriminate against vulnerable 
employees ‘with impunity’.  Yes, possibly: it might sustain a belief that private employers 
could discriminate against such employees with impunity. (from Lord Wilson, Hounga v 
Allen, at para 44).  
The Supreme Court interpreted the doctrine of illegality against the previous 
decisions. Lord Wilson expressed concern that the defense could condone the abusive 
behaviour of the employers, rather than the actions of opportunistic employees. Lord Wilson 
went on to discuss trafficking and modern-day slavery. Modern day slavery allegations 
against Mrs Allen were not considered at the tribunal level perhaps due to the alleged consent 
and action taken by Miss Hounga herself, seemingly demonstrating that she was not an actor 
and not a hapless victim. Also, Parliament was only debating the Modern Slavery Bill in 
2014, during the time of the Supreme Court hearing. Thus, the legal lens through which the 
employment tribunal, and Court of Appeal, regarded Miss Hounga was restricted to the 
contract of employment, where illegality overwhelmed all other factors in the case.  
Legal subjects, conventionally understood within a liberal, legal understanding are 
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compartmentalised into particular categories, in this case the employee and employer 
relationship. Fitting subjects into predetermined categories ignores other factors of the 
working relationship, in this case the exploitation and vulnerability experienced. Ignoring the 
context behind these employment relationships is arguably what makes employment law 
efficient and transferrable to different and diverse contexts. Yet, as was made clear in 
Hounga, forcing conformity into these categories and limited interpretations exacerbates the 
gaps that cause certain populations to exist beyond legal protection. Notwithstanding the 
immigration transgression of her presence in the UK, Lord Wilson held that, ‘it would be a 
breach of the UK’s international obligations under the Convention for its law to cause Miss 
Hounga’s complaint to be defeated by the defence of illegality.’ (Wilson para 50).  
The Supreme Court allowed Miss Hounga’s appeal to receive compensation for the 
discrimination she experienced while working and living with the Allen’s. Miss Hounga was 
deemed ‘worthy’ (Wilson para 56) of legal protection and a victim of conditions akin to 
modern-day slavery, and the law was used to respond accordingly.  
Taiwo v Olaigbe and Onu v Akwiwu [2016] 
Ms Taiwo and Ms Onu were, similar to Miss Hounga, brought from Nigeria to work 
in domestic, private households. Their cases were jointly heard at the UK Supreme Court on 
appeal, with Lady Hale delivering the judgement. Both women were independently employed  
to take care of the household and children. However, their right to employment in the UK 
(including their immigration status) was tied to their employers as per immigration rules on 
foreign workers. In both Ms Taiwo and Ms Onu’s employment tribunal hearings, it was held 
that ‘the reason for the employers’ mistreatment of their employees was their victims’ 
vulnerability owing to their precarious immigration status’ (Lady Hale para 2). The Supreme 
Court, therefore, had to decide whether the two women suffered discrimination because of, or 
on the basis of, immigration status – which, under the Equality Act 2010, would constitute 
discrimination because of, or on the basis of, nationality (EA 2010 s 9 (1) b).  
The facts of their situations were as follow: Ms Taiwo arrived to the UK to escape 
poverty in Nigeria and work in the Olaigbe household, in order to send money home to her 
children. While Ms Taiwo’s entry into the country was legal, via a domestic worker visa, the 
Olaigbe’s fabricated a contract of employment, and failed to show her the contract or pay her 
for her work. Ms Taiwo’s passport was taken from her and she was routinely abused 
physically and mentally. Ms Onu was employed by Mr and Mrs Akwiwu and, similar Ms 
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Taiwo, was brought to the UK on a domestic worker visa, but with information falsified by 
the employers. Once Ms Onu was in the Akwiwu’s residence, they refused to pay her for her 
work. Ms Onu was refused rest periods and annual leave. She was regularly threatened that if 
she tried to run away, she would be arrested and imprisoned. In both Ms Taiwo and Ms 
Onu’s experiences, their passports were taken and withheld from them by their employers. 
According to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Ms Taiwo’s situation was ‘systematic 
and callous exploitation’ (Hale para 4). Nevertheless, her ill treatment by her employer was 
held not to be due to her being Nigerian (race/nationality), but because she was a precarious 
migrant: precarious because her status depended on her employers, Mr and Mrs Olaigbe. On 
the basis that immigration status is not a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010 
(chapter 1, s 4), the Supreme Court too rejected the appeals from both Ms Taiwo and Ms 
Onu. It was held that the rejection was ‘not because these appellants do not deserve a remedy 
for all the grievous harms they have suffered. It is because the present law, while able to 
redress some of those harms, cannot redress them all.’ (Hale para 34). 
 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the abuse suffered by these women held in 
exploitative working conditions needed recognition and compensation. However, the 
Equality Act 2010’s anti-discrimination provisions under employment law or the Modern 
Slavery Act 2015 lacked the jurisdiction to recognize their legal subjectivity and 
remedy/compensate for their ill treatment. Here, the law was not able to respond to the 
exploitation they experienced, but rather affirmed the limit of law’s reach at the existing 
statutory provisions for anti-discrimination and the protected characteristics.  
Arguably the law, formally understood and administered, failed all three women. 
Existing provisions under the Employment Rights Act and Equality Act, the statutory 
foundations of UK employment law, failed to extend themselves to these vulnerable irregular 
migrants at work. Yet the shifting subjectivity of these irregular’ workers was used to shape 
them into legal subjects, where in the case of Miss Hounga the law was able to shine the light 
and grant compensation. She was deemed worthy of protection because of her vulnerability 
akin to the modern slavery being discussed in Parliament and because she did not profit or 
benefit from her illegality – her situation was not seen to condone illegal entry, but rather 
could be seen to condone employers abusing vulnerable workers. In the case of Ms Taiwo 
and Ms Onu, their exploitation and abuse was recognised as being ‘callous and systematic’, 
but not due to a characteristic recognised by UK law. The limit of the law would have to be 
stretched too far to recognize immigration status as a characteristic in need to protection, in 
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spite of the obvious vulnerability their precarious immigration status created.  
Groundlessness and the Legal Subject 
What, then, does the legal subjectivity of the irregular migrant worker rest on? Where, 
or what, is its foundation? Vulnerability to exploitation and a need for protection are not 
enough. But conformity with the standard employment relationship and citizenship is not a 
definitive prerequisite. This illustrates how the limit of the law, and the basis of legal 
recognition to grant legal subjectivity and protection are groundless. In other words, when we 
search for the core of the legal subject, we find no rock-bed, no foundation. Because there is 
no-thing at the basis of the law: Law is no object or thing in and of itself (see Nancy 1993, 
47-48, 55). Law responds to, shapes and is shaped by, experiences in and of the world. Thus, 
the subject of the law, while a thing (a noun: a person, a figure, a being) is not constituted 
from something before it—it cannot be presupposed based on an external other. Undeniably, 
the legal frame provides us with ‘ideal’v legal actors: the formal employee, the single 
employer, the migrant worker present with a valid, temporary work visa. But in practice, few 
subjects fit these character molds. Therefore what constitutes the law and the subjects of the 
law is the experience of beings, of people working and relating in society.  
Groundlessness is the condition of there being ‘nothing other than experience of sense 
(and this is the world) if “experience” says that sense precedes all appropriation or succeeds 
on and exceeds it.’ (Nancy 1997, 11, 159). The experience of work and the relation of 
working presuppose subjectivity because experience precedes and exceeds categories. And so 
if experience is what we have, all that we have, as a foundation, then foundation is without 
one, single, solid ground; it is groundless. The bodies at work, as evident in the cases of 
Hounga and Taiwo & Onu, re-constitute law’s limit by challenging the formal predetermined 
boundary and legal category. Bodies, the people that work and interact in the labour market 
and nation-state, are part of the constitution of law by challenging it beyond itself—to a 
beyond that is unknown until the experience of the judgment. It is only through the 
circulation of beings, as the experience of bodies at work, that do we have law, society and 
economy. Bodies have a constitutional role because Being presupposes any subjectivity 
placed onto being.vi  
Furthermore, law’s existence as no-thing is consistent because no single foundation 
can be found to collectively ground being and world. Therefore law cannot ‘be’ something, 
but is responsive to the constitutional relationality and action of bodies. Put into action for 
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labour law and persons at work, this means that when thinking of labour and law the very 
nature of law needs to be recognised for its ambivalence. Work and the relationality that is 
formed through working are elemental to our subjectivity and cannot be predetermined or 
prescribed. Otherwise, respect, dignity and rights will never be attainable for the most 
vulnerable of workers (those with precarious, irregular status, working in the lowest forms of 
labour and employment).  
Groundless Legal Subjects 
The irregular migrant is a condition of the impossibility for existing legal frames, 
which use as their reference a predetermined notion of what is ‘regular' and what is ‘legal’ 
that is based on a limited liberal subject. The presence and experience of persons at work do 
not fit into pre-determined frameworks of legal subjectivity, and in practice legal subjects 
extend beyond these frames and categories. The legal gaps that reinforce migration situations 
considered irregular reveal that the categories of migration law exist for limited recognition 
of a particular conforming legal subject. If one is not recognised as within this legal category, 
one is irregular. Yet legal categories are not built from some elemental core, they are a 
construct of a particular modern legal system that does not reflect labour market practices.  
Those who are not recognised as easily fitting into categories of UK employment law 
when bringing a grievance to the employment tribunal and then appealing to the UK Supreme 
Court – Miss Hounga, Ms Taiwo and Ms Onu – are nevertheless subjected to the law and are 
subjects of the law. Employment law rests on the employment contract and contractual 
principles – which, in Miss Hounga’s case in the Court of Appeal, affirmed the doctrine of 
illegality. Embedded within this contract-based definition of employment is a particular legal 
subject as worker: a national with formal citizenship status, who is a full employee working 
for one employer in a workplace that is neither the employer nor employees place of 
residence, and rights (benefits, holiday pay, sick leave and pension) are delegated 
accordingly. Miss Hounga’s presence and experience of exploitation challenged the limits of 
employment law (including the doctrine of illegality) and ultimately demanded that her 
vulnerability be recognised and compensated. Ms Taiwo and Ms Onu’s respective 
experiences also demanded recognition, but met the limit of the law at the limit of anti-
discrimination protected characteristics. The three women’s experiences as legal subjects 
illustrate how legal categories and limits can shift in practice, because at the base the legal 
subject is nothing but the person standing before the law, constituting the law. 
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The cases of Hounga and Taiwo & Onu demonstrate the irregular migrant exposes 
how the law itself - and legal subjects under the law – is founded in groundlessness. 
Nevertheless, limited recognition in formal categories of employment law persist in creating 
and maintaining irregular situations, which in turn bear the burden of depleted rights and 
protection. The presence of irregular migrant workers allow employers and businesses to 
demand cheaper, more temporary and precarious forms of labour in order to maintain 
economic market competitiveness in processes of neoliberalisation. However, when law is 
taken from its fixed form and recognised in its practice or application as simultaneously 
determinate and indeterminate, law does not withhold legal subjectivity. Within such an 
understanding of law, the only sense we can make of legal subjectivity is that all legal 
subjects are founded in groundlessness. Labour migration and the challenges arising out of 
cross-border movement whereby workers are labelled as ‘irregular’ are exemplary of the 
constitutive groundlessness of our being against the frameworks of juridical, political and 
economic categories. Meaning that our subject-hood and the way we see and relate to each 
other is only ever formed by our experience. Therefore law must respond to these 
experiences, not be beholden to predetermined frames of recognition, to protect the fair 







i EU Freedom of Movement: Article 3(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Article 21, Titles 
IV and V, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 45 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
ii For more on the gaps inherent in the law, see Tataryn 2016. 
iii See Lindahl 2009, for his explication of the migrant as the ‘included-as-excluded’. 
iv  For more analysis of the doctrine of illegality in Hounga v Allen see Bogg and Green 2015. 
v  See Anderson 2013, for a discussion of the ‘ideal’ or ‘good’ citizen and ‘good’ migrant versus the 
failed citizen and failed migrant.  
vi This claim is similar to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach of subjectivity as living body 
(Merleau Ponty 2013, 121). The difference, however, is in my contention that the subject is 
constituted by the relationality of experience. In other words, the living body not in isolation, but the 
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